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THE PUBLIC SECURITY AND WIRE TAPPING
Herbert Brownell, Jr.*
Wire tapping has been a matter of public concern, challenge and raging
controversy for more than twenty-five years. Since it invades the privacy
of the individual, it presents a problem that touches each of us. Every-
one agrees that unrestrained and unrestricted wire tapping by private
persons for private gain is "dirty business" which should be stopped.
Many persons believe that even if wire tapping is properly controlled and
authorized, it is an intolerable instrument of tyranny, impinges on the
liberties of the people and should not be sanctioned anywhere in a free
country. To many other persons, surveillance of the wires by law enforce-
ment officers under strict official supervision in cases involving national
security and defense as well as other heinous crimes, such as kidnapping,
is an essential and reasonable adjustment between the rights of the indi-
vidual and the needs and interests of society.
In our search for a new solution to this old problem, we are aided
somewhat by recent experience and disclosures of successful communist
espionage penetration in our government and by betrayal of our vital
secrets. Yet it is precisely at such a time as this when popular opinion
and passion run so high that we must be most careful that reason and
justice prevail and that the law alone shall provide the test by which evi-
dence is obtained and men are tried. Only in this way may we avoid total-
itarian techniques and tactics in preserving our democratic ideals and
freedom.
There is now pending in Congress a number of bills to regulate wire
tapping. Before discussing these, I plan to trace briefly the history and
background of wiretap laws; the construction placed on these laws both
by the courts and my predecessors at the Justice Department; the way
in which these laws have thwarted prosecution of spies, subversives and
espionage agents; and pending proposals before Congress which will
remedy existing defects in the law.
* See Contributors' section, Masthead, p. 271, for biographical data.
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Earliest references to laws relating to listening devices are found in
the penal provisions of state laws during the last half of the nineteenth
century.' At that time the development of telegraph facilities created a
need for the protection of this form of communication. However, these
statutes were more concerned with protecting the property of the tele-
graph company rather than the privacy of the individual. Prosecutions
were few, with little resort to the law. With the rise of organized crime
during prohibition days, and perfection of monitoring devices, wire tap-
ping was used widely by enforcement officers to detect crime.
Apparently, widespread and indiscriminate wire tapping was of par-
ticular concern for security reasons to the Secretary of War in 1918.
He feared that "what was whispered in the closet would soon be pro-
claimed from the housetops." As a result, Congress placed an absolute
ban on wire tapping near the end of the First World War.2 It was re-
vived in the post-war period, the device playing an important role in
Attorney General Palmer's raids on prohibition violators. 3 The Depart-
ment of Justice continued to use the technique until 1924 at which time
Attorney General Stone and later Attorney General Sargent prohibited it.
This policy was adhered to until January 1931.
Meanwhile in 1928, the Supreme Court.by a narrow margin of five to
four in Olnstead v. United States4 held that introduction of wire tapping
evidence against the defendant, a bootlegger, neither violated his rights
against unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment nor
his rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Speak-
ing for the majority, Chief Justice Taft said that "A standard which
would forbid the reception of evidence if obtained by other than nice
ethical conduct by government officials would make society suffer and
give criminals greater immunity than has been known heretofore. ' 5 Mr.
Justice Holmes, in a famous dissent, declared that wire tapping was
"dirty business," and that it was "a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part."6 In an-
other landmark dissent, Mr. Justice Brandeis said, "Writs of assistance
and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression
compared with wire tapping."'
1 Rosenzweig, "The Law of Wire Tapping," 32 Cornell L.Q. 73, 74, 514 (1947).
2 Westin, "The Wire Tapping Problem: An Analysis and A Legislative Proposal," 52
Col. L. Rev. 165, 172 (1952); 40 Stat. 1017 (1918).
8 Id.
4 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
5 Id. at 468.
6 Id. at 470.
7 Id. at 476. Cf. Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890).
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During the next few years, several bills were introduced in the Congress
to prohibit wire tapping, but none of these bills was passed. In 1931,
Attorney General William D. Mitchell recognized that the Government
was operating at a considerable disadvantage in coping with the modern
scientific weapons used by gangsters. He declared that tapping of wires
by an agent of a department would be permitted but only upon the per-
sonal direction of the Chief of the Bureau involved, after consultation
with the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the case. In 1933,
Attorney General Cummings defended this policy as necessary in the
public interest.'
In 1934, six years after the Olmstead case, Congress enacted the Fed-
eral Communications Act. Section 605' provided in part that "no person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance ... of such inter-
cepted communication to any person."
The question soon arose as to whether mere interception by federal
agents of messages was forbidden by Section 605. The Attorney General
at that time took the view that what the law prohibited was both inter-
ception and divulgence, and that mere report of the intercepted message
to public officials by FBI or other federal agents did not constitute
divulgence.10
Repeatedly thereafter, the position was taken by the Department of
Justice that section 605 was designed to prevent unauthorized persons
from intercepting radiograms or telephone conversations, and to penalize
telegraph and telephone operators who divulge the contents of messages,
rather than to bar federal agents from obtaining necessary information
in the public interest.
8 Hearings on Department of Justice Appropriations Bill before Subcommittee of House
and Senate Committees on Appropriations, 72nd Cong., 2d Sess. 33, 72-73 (1933).
9 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1946).
10 The debate on the Federal Communications Act was strangely silent on section 605.
Not one word is said about making evidence obtained by wire tapping inadmissible in
evidence or about prohibiting wire tapping. Even the Olmstead case is not mentioned.
See 73 Cong. Rec. 4138, 8822-8837, 8842-8854, 10304-10332 (1934). From the Senate
and House Reports, it appears that the purpose of the bill was merely to create a Com-
munications Commission with regulatory power over all forms of electrical communica-
tions, whether by telephone, telegraph, cable or radio. It was also to extend to wire
communications the almost identical provisions of section 27 of the Radio Act of 1927
which were thought neither to apply to Federal officers nor to bar testimony as to the
contents of radio messages intercepted by them. See, Hearings before Committee on Ex-
penditures in Executive Departments on Wire Tapping, etc., 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 24 (1931).
See also, Sen. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); H.R. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1934); Notes, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 865-866 (1940); 1 Bill of Rights Rev. 48, 49
(1940); 2 J. of Pub. L. 199, 201 (1953); 45 Ill. L. Rev. 689 (1950).
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In 1937, section 605 had its first test before the Supreme Court in
Nardone v. United States." Conviction of the defendants, who were
liquor smugglers, was reversed upon the ground that section 605 rendered
inadmissible in criminal proceedings in the Federal court wiretap evidence
even when obtained by federal officers. In the opinion by Mr. Justice
Roberts, the court concluded that "Congress may have thought it less
important that some offenders should go unwhipped of justice than that
officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with ethical stand-
ards and destructive of personal liberty."
In 1939, section 605 was extended by the Supreme Court to apply not
only to ban direct wiretap evidence, but also evidence obtained from inter-
cepted leads, the "fruit of the poisonous tree;" 2 and to intrastate as well
as interstate telephone conversations.3 In 1940, a court of appeals ap-
plied the law to cases where only one party consented to the inter-
ception.1
4
N one of these decisions rendered by the Supreme Court held that wire
tapping by federal officers in and of itself was illegal, absent divulgence.
This may have accounted for the continued adherence to the position
taken by the Justice Department until 1940 that mere interception of
wire communications is not prohibited by section 605 so long as there is
no subsequent public divulgence of the contents of the interception.' 5
11 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Referring to that part of section 605 which provides "No
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept ...and divulge the . . . contents
. .. to any person," the court said at 381, "Taken at face value the phrase 'no person'
comprehends Federal agents, and the ban on communication to 'any person' bars testimony
to the content of an intercepted message."
12 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial
court's satisfaction that wire-tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is estab-
lished ... the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused
to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous
tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court that
its proof had an independent origin.
Id. at 341.
13 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
14 United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653
(1940). Contra: United States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480 (D.D.C. 1953); United States
v. Guller, 101 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1951); United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970 (D.D.C.
1950), rev'd on other grounds, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
15 Two decisions by the Supreme Court in 1942 appeared to lend support to the
Department's position. In one case, Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942), a mail
fraud, the Court held that one not a party to tapped conversations by Federal officers,
had no standing to object to their use by the Government to obtain testimony. See 55
Harv. L. Rev. 141 (1941). In the other case, Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942), a conspiracy to violate the Bankruptcy Act, the court held that neither section
605 nor the Fourth Amendment were violated, when Federal officers obtained recordings
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In 1940, Attorney General Jackson revised the policy once again, or-
dered that the wire tapping technique was no longer to be used and that
cases based on such evidence were not to be prosecuted.' 6 Attorney Gen-
eral Jackson's action, which was one of short duration, appears to have
been based on the opinion that interception of conversations was illegal'
under section 605 of the Communications Act. This view was altered
soon thereafter when President Roosevelt authorized Attorney General
Jackson to approve wire tapping, when necessary, in security cases.17
In 1941, Attorney General Jackson said:
Experience has shown that monitoring of telephone communications is
essential in connection with investigations of foreign spy rings. It is equally
necessary for the purpose of solving such crimes as kidnapping and ex-
tortion. In the interest of national defense as well as of internal safety
the interception of communications should in a limited degree be per-
mitted to Federal law enforcement officers.' 8
In 1942, Attorney General Francis Biddle testifying before the House
Committee on the Judiciary was asked whether he believed that wire
tapping should end when the emergency expired. Mr. Biddle replied:
I personally think wire tapping is important to discover those types of sub-
versive crimes that I do not believe will be ended when the emergency
is ended. So I do not think it should be limited to the emergency.19
From 1945 to 1949, Attorney General Clark favored interception of
communications in cases vitally affecting the domestic security or where
human life was in jeopardy. In 1949, he said, "It seems incongruous
that existing law should protect our enemies and hamper our pro-
tectors."2 o
In 1951, and again in 1952, Attorney General McGrath declared that
he fully supported a wiretap law because the Department of Justice had
been seriously hampered in fulfilling its statutory duty of prosecuting
of the defendant's conversation over the phone with the aid of a detectaphone placed
over the wall of an adjoining room. See 91 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 82 (1942).
16 Press Statement of Department of Justice released for March 18, 1940, dated March
15, 1940.
17 May 21, 1940. See also Statement of J. Edgar Hoover in 58 Yale L.J. 423 (1949).
18 Report to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on a Wiretap Bill, February 10, 1941,
Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16-20 (1941).
19 Testimony of February 18, 1942 on H.J. Res. 283, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1942).
See also, statement in N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1941, p. 4, col. 2, indicating that wiretapping
was authorized in security cases. More recently on January 11, 1954, Mr. Biddle is reported
to have urged a "realistic acceptance of the use of wiretapping in certain criminal cases."
Washington Post, January 12, 1954.
20 95 Cong. Rec. 442 (Jan. 18, 1949). See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1949,. p. 1, col. 8.
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those who violate the federal defense and security laws."' In 1952, At-
torney General McGranery was of the same opinion.
Thus you can see that except for a short period during 1940, every
Attorney General over the last twenty-two years has favored and au-
thorized wire tapping by federal officers in security cases and other
heinous crimes such as kidnapping. Moreover, this policy adhered to by
my predecessors has been taken with the full knowledge, consent and ap-
proval of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.
Although monitoring of telephone communications by the FBI upon
authority of the Attorney General and under specific safeguards to the
individual has been established practice for many years, yet the rule in
the federal court since the first Nardone decision in 1937 has been that
evidence obtained through this technique is inadmissible to establish the
guilt of the accused. This rule of evidence persists, not because of any
provision or right contained in the Constitution, but solely because of sec-
tion 605 of the Federal Communications Act.
Under section 605, as construed by the Supreme Court, the wiretaps
might disclose that the accused has stolen and peddled important bomb
secrets, or that he was plotting the assassination of a high government
official, or that he was about to blow up a strategic defense plant or com-
mit some other grave offense, but neither the information obtained there-
by, or other information or clues to which the wiretaps indirectly led
could be introduced to convict this defendant. Indeed, if either all the
evidence or any part of the vital evidence was obtained through this
means, the defendant would go scot-free.
It was this loophole in our federal law of evidence that led to reversal
of the conviction in the Coplon case22 even though Judge Learned Hand,
21 Statement prepared for delivery before the Third Annual Institute of the Smith County
Bar Association in Tyler, Texas, April 7, 1951. See also letter of Feb. 2, 1952, from Mr.
McGrath to Chairman of the House Committee on the judiciary on H.R. 1947.
22 United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952).
In this case, Judith Coplon, a former employee of the Department of Justice was convicted
of an attempt to deliver certain government documents to a Russian agent. Upon appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant urged that her conviction
should be reversed. Of the grounds for reversal two were that the prosecution had failed
to prove that the "taps" of her wires, conceded to have been made, did not "lead" to any
part of the evidence on which she was convicted; and that the trial court improperly
cut short her effort to prove that telephone talks to which she was a party had been
intercepted before the time when the conceded "taps" began to be made. Some of the
"tap" records were withheld from scrutiny by defense on the ground that disclosure
would be of peril to national security. These "secret" taps were examined by the judge
alone. On the basis of all the records, including those which the defense could not see,
on the basis of oral testimony upon the hearing, the judge decided that none of the
Government's trial evidence stemmed from wiretapping, and that it was admissible. The
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speaking for the court of appeals, refused to dismiss the indictment be-
cause the "guilt is plain."23
Everyone agrees that invasion of privacy is repugnant to all Ameri-
cans. But how can we possibly preserve the safety and liberty of every-
one in this nation unless we pull federal prosecuting attorneys out of
their strait-jackets and permit them to use intercepted evidence in the
trial of security cases and other heinous offenses such as kidnapping?
Let us not delude ourselves any longer. We might just as well face up
to the fact that the communists are subversives and conspirators working
fanatically in the interests of a hostile foreign power. Again and again
they have demonstrated that an integral part of their policy is the in-
ternal disruption and destruction of this and other free governments of
the world. That they penetrated our diplomatic corps was shown by the
lesson learned from Alger Hiss and others. That they had even greater
success in atomic espionage and in stealing crucial secrets was shown by
the lesson learned from Klaus Fuchs, the Rosenbergs and others. That
they wove their interlocking web of intrigue in the State, Treasury, Labor
and Agriculture Departments, on Capitol Hill, in national defense and in
the U.N. is shown by many others now in the communist hall of in-
famy.2
4
court of appeals held that the judge's failure to disclose all the "taps" to the defendant
violated the Sixth Amendment, which requires the accused to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. See, "The Coplon Case: Wiretapping, State Secrets and National
Security," 60 Yale L.J. 736 (1951).
Upon another appeal, Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 926 (1952), the Court suggested a further restriction on wiretapping in holding that
interception of telephone calls between a defendant and her attorney during the trial
violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment by denying to defendant the
effective aid of counsel.
23 Yet in a number of states, wiretap evidence is used in local courts in prosecution
of even mild offenses. Westin, supra note 2. See Notes, 40 J. Crim. L. and Criminology
476, 477 (1949); 53 A.L.R. 1485 (1928); 66 A.L.R. 397 (1930); 134 A.L.R. 614 (1941).
See also, 71 A.L.R. 5, 61 (1931); 105 A.L.R. 326 (1936). However, this rule may prevail
in those state courts principally because at common law evidence was admissible even
if obtained through unlawful means. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466-467
(1928). See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 755 (1952); 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§§ 2183, 2184(b) (3d ed. 1940). In Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), the Supreme
Court held that section 605 of the Communications Act did not bar wiretapped conversa-
tions as evidence in a state court. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) the Court held
that in a criminal prosecution in a state court the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid
admission of relevant evidence even though obtained by an unlawful and unreasonable
search and seizure. See also, Note, 13 Md. L. Rev. 235 (1953).
24 "Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments," Report of Subcommittee on
the Judiciary, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (July 30, 1953) ; Report of Special Senate Subcommittee
on Security Affairs, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (April 17, 1953); Report of House Committee
on Un-American Activities, "The Shameful Years," (Dec. 30, 1951); Report of Senate
1954]
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It is almost impossible to "spot" them since they no longer use mem-
bership cards or other written documents which will identify them for
what they are. As a matter of necessity, they turn to the telephone to
carry on their intrigue. The success of their plans frequently rests upon
piecing together shreds of information received from many sources and
many nests. The participants in the conspiracy are often dispersed and
stationed in various strategic positions in government and industry
throughout the country. Their operations are not only internal. They
are also of an international and intercontinental character. The Senate
Subcommittee on the Judiciary recently reported that "Thousands of
diplomatic, military, scientific and economic secrets of the United States
have been stolen by Soviet agents in our government and other persons
closely connected with the Communists."25 When the enemy will strike
next, who will be its next victim, what valuable government secret will be
the subject of a new theft, where a leading fugitive conspirator is being
concealed, are all matters communist agents can freely talk about over
the telephone today without fear that they may ever be confronted in a
criminal proceeding with what they said.
Moreover, if you get a communist or fellow-subversive on the witness
stand, you cannot expect him to tell the truth of his own treachery or that
of his confederates. It is his duty as a Communist to lie under oath; to
throw every obstacle in the way of conviction of these fellow party mem-
bers; to defend these members by all possible means; and to refuse to
give testimony for the state in any form.26
Since these enemy agents will not talk in court or speak the truth, and
since federal agents are forbidden from testifying to what they heard
over the phone, the Department of Justice is blocked from proving its
case and sending these spies and espionage agents to jail where they be-
long. The result is that many of the persons responsible for these grave
misdeeds are still at large.
Now you would not think of releasing a mad dog to prey on our chil-
dren. You would put him away where he could do no future harm. So,
too, it is not enough merely to uproot and dismiss the disloyal from gov-
ernment or out of other sensitive positions in industry or commerce. They
should be tried fairly with all the constitutional safeguards to an accused
Committee on the judiciary, Sen. Rep. 2230, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12, 16, 24-25 (1950)
on Internal Security Act [(8 U.S.C. 22 (Supp. 1950))]. And see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580 (1952); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
25 "Interlocking Subversion," etc., supra note 24, at 49.
26 See Hook, "The Fifth Amendment-A Moral Issue," New York Times Magazine
Section, Nov. 1, 1953, p. 9.
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that our law provides. But if the evidence establishes their guilt, be it
from their overt actions or from the lips of their confederates, or from
intercepted evidence obtained by federal officers as authorized, these
wrongdoers too should be put away where they will no longer continue to
prey on the liberty and freedom of this nation. The mere fact that they
have cleverly resorted to the telephone and telegraph to carry out their
treachery should no longer serve as a shield to punishment. The rule
of evidence which has protected them all these years should now be abol-
ished. Surely this nation need not wait until it has been destroyed be-
fore learning who its traitors are and bringing them to justice.27
There is evidence in the hands of the Department as the result of
investigations conducted by the FBI which would prove espionage in
certain of these cases. If the law is changed so as to admit evidence
obtained through wire tapping, the Department will be in a position to
proceed with a re-examination of these cases to determine which shall
be prosecuted.
We turn now to the contentions raised by the opponents to pending
bills authorizing wire tapped evidence to be admitted in the Federal
courts. There is, of course, one group of persons who will oppose these
pending bills only because they will seal the fate of many spies and sub-
versives who have heretofore found refuge in our existing wiretap law.
Unquestionably, these persons will loudly deplore the need of any change
in the law; they will piously predict dire results to the freedom they
themselves are seeking to destroy; and they will attempt to engage the
aid of unsuspecting liberal forces in order to keep the hands of enforce-
ment officials tied. These are typical tactics of our internal enemies with
which we are all familiar. Aware of them, we may be on our guard.
We must be careful, however, not to confuse these persons with loyal
statesmen, lawyers, judges and others who sincerely believe that the
country stands to lose more than to gain from admitting wire tapped
evidence in federal criminal cases. It would be a sad day in America
if a person becomes suspect merely because he does not see eye-to-eye
with us on how best to resolve the ever-present conflict between the
rights of society on the one hand, and the rights of the individual on the
other.
What Chief Justice Warren recently said needs frequent reminder:
When men are free to explore all avenues of thought, no matter what prej-
udices may be aroused, there is a healthy climate in the nation .... The
27 Senator Ferguson in Newsweek, Jan. 11, 1954, p. 20, col. 1; 100 Cong. Rec. A. 56
(Jan. 7, 1954).
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founding fathers themselves were not orthodox either in thought or expres-
sion. They recognized both the right and value of dissent in their genera-
tion.28
And Chief Justice Hughes speaking for the Supreme Court has said:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incite-
ments to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more
imperative is the need . . . for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people, and that changes,
if desired, may be made by peaceful means.29
In sum, the principal reasons for opposition by this latter group to
the pending bills are that wire tapping is still "dirty business;" that we
should not fight Communist spies by imitating their methods; that wire-
taps will be used to harm innocent persons; that privacy will be invaded,
and people will be apprehensive about using the phone; and that the
authority conferred upon federal officers to wiretap may be abused.
While these arguments are persuasive on their face, they do not stand
up on analysis.
First, consider the claim that intercepted evidence should not be ad-
missible in Federal courts because wire tapping is "dirty business." Un-
questionably, this is a strong argument. Inherently, we people have little
liking for eavesdropping of any kind. Fair play and freedom mean so
much to us. Wiretap snooping reminds us of the methods employed by
the Nazi Gestapo and the Soviet OGPU.
Yet while some of these people would ban such evidence, they seem
to be unaware that the law presently admits evidence which is obtained
by informers; by eavesdroppers at someone's keyhole or window or
party line;3 0 by an officer concealed in a closet; by installation of a re-
cording device on the adjoining wall of a man's hotel or office; 3 1 by
transmitters concealed on an agent's person;3 2 by authorized search and
seizure. Moreover, under the law, a Government witness may testify to
every word of his telephone conversation with a defendant, and his testi-
mony may even be distorted by an imperfect memory or character. Yet
the federal court would not admit an exact transcription of an inter-
28 Address "Free Investigation and Faithful Experiment" before Association of the
Alumni of Columbia College, New York Times, January 15, 1954, p. 8, col. 2.
29 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
30 Cohn v. State, 120 Tenn. 61, 109 S.W. 1149 (1908) (peeping); DeLore v. Smith, 67
Ore. 304, 136 Pac. 13 (1913) (eavesdropping on party line).
31 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). And see Schoberg v. United States,
264 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 494 (1920). Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128 (1954) (microphone in hall and closet).
32 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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cepted conversation in the form of a phonograph recording.33 And the
Supreme Court only recently held that although evidence is unlawfully
seized, it is admissible in a federal criminal proceeding to establish that
the defendant lied. 4
There is little, if anything, to distinguish between these approved
methods of obtaining and admitting evidence, and wiretaps which are not
admissible.35 In these modern times, society would be severely handi-
capped unless it could resort to these methods to combat crime and to
protect itself from internal enemies.
In his monumental work on evidence, Professor Wigmore has dealt
with the argument that wiretap evidence should be inadmissible because
it is unethical and dirty business. His answer is:
But so is likely to be all apprehension of malefactors. Kicking a man in
the stomach is "dirty business," normally viewed, but if a gunman assails
you and you know enough of the French art of savatage to kick him in
the stomach and thus save your life, is that dirty business for you? 36
Professor Wigmore advocates legislation which would permit wire tapping
by federal law enforcement agencies with the approval of the highest
official of the department.
Re-evaluation of the critical situation today makes it clear that
authorized wire tapping under careful restrictions in cases involving our
national security is not "dirty business" at all, but a common sense
solution by Congress which will protect the liberty and. security of all
the people from those who wish to see it impaired.
Prior to the invention of the telephone and telegraph, you could track
a criminal down by shadowing him and checking his contacts. These
days, most spies, traitors, and espionage agents are usually far too clever
and devious in their operations to allow themselves to be caught walking
down the street with their accomplices.37 Trailing them or trapping them
is difficult unless you can tap their messages. Convicting them is practi-
cally impossible unless you can use these wiretaps in court. And it is,
of course, too late to do anything about it after sabotage, assassinations
and "fifth column" activities are completed."
It is therefore neither reasonable nor realistic that Communists should
33 Bernstein, "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree," 37 Ill. L. Rev. 99, 112-113 (1942).
34 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
35 See Note, 40 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 476, 477 (1949); Foley v. United States,
64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933) cert. denied, 289 U.S. 762 (1933).
36 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2184(b), p. 50. See also, Note by Wigmore, 23 Ill. L. Rev.
377 (1928).
37 See Time, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 13, col. 1.
38 See Senator Ferguson, supra note 27.
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be allowed to have the free use of every modern communication device
to carry out their unlawful conspiracies, but that -law enforcement
agencies should be barred from confronting these persons with what
they have said over them.
Some opponents to wire tapping also claim that they are concerned
with the protection of innocent persons who through no fault of their
own may have become enmeshed with spies and subversives. This argu-
ment has no real validity. The proposed laws will not permit the use
of this evidence against innocent persons. Its use will be confined solely
to criminal proceedings initiated by the Government against those
criminals who seek to subvert our country's welfare. No innocent per-
son would be hurt by legislation authorizing wiretaps to be admissible
against our internal enemies. No intercepted evidence could ever be made
public until a grand jury had indicted the accused for espionage, sabotage
or related crimes. Even upon a trial, no conversation or evidence ob-
tained by wiretap could be introduced in court until a Federal judge had
concluded that it was relevant material and obtained with the approval
of the Attorney General.
Testifying in recent hearings on wire tapping, Miles F. McDonald,
former Assistant United States Attorney and District Attorney of Kings
County, New York, said the following on this point:
I have never seen any case where an innocent person was harmed by a
wiretap order, and I have been at the business for 14 years. If you do not
give the people the right to tap a wire, you are just giving the enemies of
our country the right to a secret dispatch case that you cannot possibly
find out about.... You are giving to the enemy every bit of technological
progress.39
Opponents of wire tapping also charge that it encourages invasion of
the individual's privacy; that the principle is wrong; that it violates the
spirit if not the language of the First Amendment safeguarding freedom
of speech, in that people are made fearful of using the telephone; 40 and
that a person would have to mind his speech over the phone lest a wire
tapper would be waiting for him "to put his foot into his mouth."'" It
would be just as reasonable to claim that people are afraid of walking
in the street because policemen carry clubs and guns.
Contrary to general impression, authorizing the introduction of inter-
39 Hearings on Wiretapping for National Security before Subcommittee No. 3, House
Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 408, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1953).
40 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 19, 1953; Arnold, "Wire Tapping: The Pros and Cons,"
New York Times, Magazine Section, Nov. 29, 1953, p. 12. Hearings supra note 39, at
53-65.
41 Saturday Evening Post, Dec. 12, 1953, p. 27.
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cepted evidence in the federal court would not interfere in any way with
telephone privacy. As the law stands now, it does not stop people from
tapping wires. It is still useful to those who make private use of it for
personal gain. What has been stopped is the use of such evidence to
enforce the laws against criminals. As Mr. Justice Jackson observed
while Attorney General, the decisions only protect those engaged in in-
criminating conversations from having them reproduced in court. These
decisions merely lay down rules of evidence. He said:
Criminals today have the free run of our communications systems, but
the law enforcement officers are denied even a carefully restricted power
to confront the criminal with his telephonic and telegraphic footprints. 42
It is also claimed that even controlled, restricted monitoring of the
wires should not be permitted since the authority may be abused by
irresponsible and indiscriminate use of it.43 This apprehension is entirely
understandable. Unfortunately, wire tapping has been brought into dis-
repute because of widespread abuse of it by private peepers in marital
investigations; by snoopers in labor, business, and political rivalries; and
by some unscrupulous local enforcement officers in shaking down racket-
eers, gamblers and keepers of disorderly houses. 4' The stigma and taint
which has accompanied improper use of wire tapping for private gain
has contributed in large measure to the distrust and distaste which many
people now have for lawful use of it by federal officers in the public
interest.
The fact that the technique has been abused by private persons and
some local enforcement officers for private benefit affords no reason for
believing that it will be abused by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Experience demonstrates that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
never abused the wiretap authority. Its record of "nonpartisan, non-
political, tireless and efficient service over the years gives ample assur-
ance that the innocent will not suffer in the process of the Bureau's alert
protection of the Nation's safety. ' 4  Mr. Hoover, himself, opposes
wire tapping as an investigative function except in connection with
crimes of the most serious character, such as offenses endangering the
42 Attorney General Jackson's letter of March 19, 1941 to Hon. Hatton W. Sumners,
Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2266; see also his letter of Feb. 10,
1941 on H.R. 3099; Hearings before House Subcommittee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2266
and H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-20 (1942).
43 See, Senator Morse in Newsweek, Jan. 11, 1954, p. 20, col. 1; 100 Cong. Rec. A. 57
(Jan. 7, 1954). Also see dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747, 760-761 (1952); Arnold, supra note 40.
44 Westin, supra note 2 at 167-172.
45 "No More Coplon Fiascos," Colliers'for Aug. 21, 1953, p. 110.
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safety of the nation or the lives of human beings. In addition he has
insisted that the technique be conducted under strict supervision of
higher authority exercised separately in respect to each specific instance.46
As President Franklin D. Roosevelt said in answer to the same ob-
jection:
This power may, of course, be abused; abuse is inherent in any govern-
mental grant of power. But to prevent that abuse [wire tapping] so far
as it is humanly possible to do so, I would confine such legislation to the
Department of Justice and to no other department.47
And the Supreme Court has declared in this connection:
It is always easy to conjure up extreme and even oppressive possibilities
in the exertion of authority .... Congress which creates and sustains these
agencies must be trusted to correct whatever defects experience may
reveal.48
So too, should abuse ever arise in the administration of the wire tap-
ping laws, then, as has happened with other federal laws, Congress may
be counted on to withdraw or restrict the power so that the abuse is
ended, and the public protected.4 9
The answer to all these fears is summed up by the forceful statement
which J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, once made:
I dare say that the most violent critic of the FBI would urge the use of
wire tapping techniques if his child were kidnapped, and held in custody.
Certainly there is as great a need to utilize this technique to protect our
country from those who would enslave us and are engaged in treason, es-
pionage, and subversion and who, if successful, would destroy our institu-
tions and democracy. 50
Surely Congress is not wedded to a law of its own making which
passage of time has shown to be unworkable and detrimental both to the
individual and the common good. What Judge Learned Hand once said
respecting another law is apt here: "There no doubt comes a time when
a statute is so obviously oppressive and absurd that it can have no
46 58 Yale LJ. 423-424 (1949); Hearings on H.R. 2266 to authorize wiretapping, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1941). Hearings on H.J. Res. 283, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 28-37
(1942).
47 Letter of President Roosevelt, Feb. 21, 1941 to Hon. Thomas H. Eliot of the House
of Representatives on H.R. 2266, Hearings supra note 18, at 257. Reprinted in Washington
Post, Feb. 26, 1941.
48 Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.; 309 U.S. 134,
146 (1940); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 44 (U.S. 1849).
49 "It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties
and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as courts." Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v.
May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
50 Statement before Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Jan. 13,
1950, p. 230.
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justification in any sane polity." 51 In light of new conditions and its
experience, Congress may properly curb abuse of the existing law; "plug"
up a serious gap in enforcement so that those guilty of espionage and
related offenses will no longer escape punishment; and thereby remove
the roadblock that now exists between society and its security. A recent
editorial framed the question in these words:
We've got wire tapping now. Why not use it where it will do the most
good-against our national enemies? 52
This is the aim of the various proposals pending in Congress. 3 These
proposals seek to strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual
and society in permitting intercepted communications to be admissible
in.Federal criminal proceedings under certain safeguards and in specific
cases involving the Nation's security and defense, as well as kidnapping.
The authors of these bills represent two different schools of thought.
One believes that the technique should be resorted to only after court
permission; the other after authorization of the Attorney General alone. 4
51 Hand, "Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day," 21 Harv. L. Rev. 495, 508
(1908).
52 Washington, D. C., "News" Dec. 1, 1953.
53 The pending bills authorizing wiretapping are H.R. 477 (Congressman Keating), H.R.
3552 (Congressman Walter), H.R. 408 (Congressman Celler), H.R. 5149 (Congressman
Reed), H.R. 7107 (Congressman Clardy), S. 2753 (Senator Potter) and S. 832 (Senator
Wiley). There is also one bill introduced on February 18, 1953 by Congressman Chudoff,
H.R. 3155, which prohibits interception of telephone conversations by any officer or em-
ployee in the Executive Branch of the Government.
54 H.R. 477, introduced by Congressman Keating on January 3, 1953 and its counterpart
S. 832, introduced by Senator Wiley on February 6, 1953, are illustrative of Bills which
authorize the admissibility of wiretap evidence provided prior court order of a Federal
judge is obtained. These bills also authorize the FBI and the various military intelligence
services, under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Attorney General, to wiretap
or intercept or acquire telegrams, radiograms or other communications without regard
to the limitations contained in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. Wiretapping
would be permitted only to prevent interference with the national security and defense by
treason, sabotage, espionage, seditious conspiracy, violations of neutrality laws, or violations
by foreign agents and related acts. A federal judge would be authorized to grant an
order to intercept such information only upon a showing that there is reasonable cause
to believe that the communications may contain information which would assist in the
conduct of investigations of violations of such laws.
These bills further provide that no person shall divulge or use any information thus
intercepted for other than authorized purposes. Violation of these requirements is punish-
able as a felony. H.R. 5149, introduced by Congressman Reed on May 12, 1953, provides
simply that information "heretofore or hereafter" obtained by the FBI, upon express approval
of the Attorney General, in the course of any investigation involving the national
security or defense, shall be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings in any court
established by Act of Congress.
H.R. 408 introduced by Congressman Celler on January 3, 1953, provides for inter-
ception of communications both in cases involving the safety of human life as well as
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The objections to vesting authority to permit wire tapping in the
Attorney General are that he should not be allowed to police his own
actions; that the authority may be abused when Government prosecutors
turn out to be overzealous; that the court is more likely to be objective
and curb indiscriminate wire tapping than the Attorney General; and
that wire tapping is somewhat like a search into the privacy of an in-
dividual's affairs, and as in the case of a search, requires supervision
by the courts."5
The provision requiring an order by a Federal judge permitting wire
tapping on a showing that there is reasonable cause for the order is
patterned after a similar law in force in the State of New York for
several years.58
During the hearings on some of these bills, important objections to
the requirement of a court order as a condition to wire tapping were
crystallized. It was claimed that greater secrecy, uniformity, speed, and
better supervision by Congress over the administration of wire tapping
could be secured if no court order was necessary, and that abuse of the
technique would be avoided by requiring the approval of the Attorney
General alone.5"
Unquestionably, secrecy is essential for the success of wire tapping.
It has been wisely said that "three men can keep a secret only if two
men die." 58 There is indeed strong danger of leaks if application is made
to a court, because in addition to the judge, you have the clerk, the
stenographer and some other officer like a law assistant or bailiff who
may be apprised of the nature of the application.59
those cases involving national security and defense. Under this bill too, merely the ap-
proval of the Attorney General is required. Like H.R. 5149, H.R. 408 also permits the
use of wiretap evidence obtained in the past with the express approval of the Attorney
General. Such a law would not offend the Ex Post Facto provisions of the Constitution
since it would not authorize conviction upon less proof in amount or degree than was
required when the crime was committed, but merely change the rules of evidence. Cf.
Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898).
55 Hearings on Wire Tapping, supra note 39, at 56, 63, 66, 80-81.
56 Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E.2d 854 (1946); N.Y.
Const. Art. 1, § 12; N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813(a); N.Y. Penal Law § 552(a). Westin
supra note 2, at 194-197 indicates that the New York Law has been abused. Westin
recommends wiretapping under a similar but more strictly controlled system under court
supervision and order. See too, Woodring, Wire Tapping 188, 191-192 (1949); Note, 1953
Wash. U.L.Q. 340, 349-350. On the other hand, the view has also been expressed that the
New York law has worked well. See Hearings supra note 39, statement of Congressman
Keating, p. 5; Testimony of Miles F. McDonald of July 8, 1953, pp. 71-90. See too,
Greenman, Wiretapping and Civil Liberties 44-45 (1938).
57 Hearings supra note 39, at 14-19.
58 Id. at 18.
59 Id. at 19.
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It was also pointed out that court consideration and permission would
make for lack of uniformity. There are about two hundred and twenty-
five different Federal district judges, each of whom would have his own
measure of what constitutes "reasonable cause." These differences
among various judges would make for considerable confusion as well as
uneven and patchwork application of the wire tapping law.60
Another objection to the requirement of the court order was that it
would be difficult for members of the Congress to exercise any super-
vision over so many Federal judges to determine whether they are prop-
erly discharging their duty under the law. It would make it far easier
for Congress to watch the situation without going too far afield, if the
authority were centralized in the Attorney General. This was also the
view of Mr. Justice Jackson while Attorney General in opposing the
search warrant procedure which would authorize over two hundred
Federal judges to permit wire tapping. He was not only concerned with
the loss of precious time involved in obtaining a court order, but felt
that probable publicity and filing of charges against persons as a basis
for wire tapping before investigation was complete might easily result
in great injury to such persons. He too concurred in the opinion that
"a centralized responsibility of the Attorney General can easily be called
in question by the Congress, but you cannot interrogate the entire
judiciary.""
There are still other considerations which seem to support the bills
to permit wire tapping upon authority of the Attorney General rather
than by the court.
First, the Attorney General is the cabinet officer primarily responsible
for the protection of the national security. This duty, of course, extends
throughout the entire United States, and is not limited to any particular
district or area of the country. He is the officer of the Government in the
best position to determine the necessity for wire tapping in the enforce-
ment of the security laws. Because the Attorney General is charged
with the responsibility of law enforcement, he should be given the author-
ity to use his judgment and discretion within constitutional limits to
obtain evidence necessary to protect our national security.
Second, security cases do not lend themselves to investigations on a
limited area basis. They often extend through numerous judicial districts.
In that connection, it should be recalled that the Gold espionage network
extended from New York to New Mexico, covering many points in
60 Id. at 19.
61 Letter of March 19, 1941, Hearings, supra note 18, at 20.
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between. The-Attorney General, whose responsibility of law enforce-
ment is nation-wide, is more likely to have a better over-all picture of
the need for granting the authority to wiretap than a judge in any one
district. For these reasons, a bill permitting designated Government
agents to wiretap upon authority of the Attorney General in security
cases where secrecy and speed are so vital, would, in my opinion, be most
effective in achieving these aims.
The essential thing is that we do not put off any longer authorizing
the admissibility of wire tapped evidence obtained by Government agents
in those cases involving the national security or defense, and kidnapping.
If our free and democratic country is to endure, we must not delay any
further making those who plot against it pay for their betrayal. If we
are to be safe, the wires of America must cease being a protected com-
munications system for the enemies of America.
Subversives, spies and the espionage agents are unquestionably hoping
that Congress will engage in such a heated squabble on this issue as again
to end up in hopeless stalemate as it has in the past. I know that Congress
at this critical time will not permit treachery and intrigue to flourish and
to continue unabated over the wires free from punishment. I feel con-
fident that Congress will fully reflect the great unity and strength of the
entire country and take the necessary action without delay. It will do
so without regard to partisanship as it has so often done in the past,
when the people's security and safety are at stake.
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